As virtually everyone in the US alcohol beverage industry knows, last week the US Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas, S.Ct. No. 18-96 (June 26, 2019). Now that over a week has passed since the release of that decision, it’s time to reflect on what it means and what is coming next. (more…)
On Friday, March 29, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri handed down its decision in Sarasota Wine Market v. Parson, No. 4:17CV2792. The decision upholds Missouri’s laws permitting in-state retailers to sell and deliver directly to consumers’ homes, but withholding that same privilege to out-of-state retailers. Plaintiffs had challenged the Missouri statutes under both the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The decision is not surprising, as Missouri lies within the jurisdiction of the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit, in a challenge to a residency requirement in a case entitled Southern Wine & Spirits v. Division of Alc. & Tobacco Control (2013), previously held that state laws regulating retailers and wholesalers are immune from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under the 21st Amendment. The Sarasota Wine Market decision relies heavily on Southern Wine & Spirits in rejecting the plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause challenge. And, the court reasoned that because the right to engage in the wine trade is subject to the limitations of the 21st Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is not implicated.
Whether the 21st Amendment insulates state laws regulating retailers and wholesalers from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is currently pending before the Supreme Court in the Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Blair (f/n/a Byrd) case. Thus, the Sarasota Wine Market opinion faces almost-certain reversal or affirmance, depending on how the Supreme Court rules in Blair. In the meantime, the decision serves to underscore the stakes of the question currently pending before the Supreme Court.
In September 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari brought before the Court by the Tennessee Retailers in Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Byrd. The petition requested that the Court review the lower court’s decision upholding a finding that Tennessee’s two-year residency requirement for retail license applicants is unconstitutional. Specifically, the question Tennessee retailers posed to the Court is whether the 21st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives states the authority to, consistent with the so-called “Dormant” Commerce Clause of the Constitution, regulate sales of alcohol beverages by imposing residency requirements on retail (or wholesale) license applicants. The court heard oral arguments on January 16, 2019.
In an article published by The New Brewer, Marc Sorini and Bethany Hatef discussed the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in the Byrd case, the circuit split it created and the potential impacts of the pending SCOTUS decision.
Originally published in The New Brewer, March/April 2019.
As you likely have read in the trade press already, on Wednesday, November 28, 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Lebamoff v. Rauner. The opinion adds three judges of the Seventh Circuit to the collection of legal minds rejecting the notion that the dormant Commerce Clause non-discrimination principles applied by the Supreme Court in Bacchus (1984) and Granholm (2005) should be limited to laws discriminating against producers and products.
Like other cases brought by Lebamoff and its legal team, this case involves a challenge to state laws that prohibit direct-to-consumer wine shipments by out-of-state retailers. Illinois, like many states, permits in-state retailers to deliver wine directly to Illinois consumers located anywhere in the state. The law, however, denies that same privilege to out-of-state retailers. This distinction, according to the plaintiffs, amounts to discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in violation of the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause.
The Seventh Circuit opinion rejects the reading of Granholm, embraced by the Second and Eighth Circuits, that the Supreme Court drew an implicit distinction between laws discriminating against producers and products (not permitted) and laws affecting the wholesale- or retail-tiers (immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny). Reading Granholm in its totality, the Seventh Circuit finds such an implied bright-line rule unlikely. Moreover, drawing on the Brown-Forman (1986) and Healy (1989) cases, the Seventh Circuit notes that prior Supreme Court opinions have applied dormant Commerce Clause principles to laws that did not regulate producers or products.
The Seventh Circuit, of course, recognized that its opinion could be substantially affected by the Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Byrd case now pending before the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of issues upon remand suggests a number of potential distinguishing facts that could alter the outcome of the case. Nevertheless, should the Supreme Court affirm the Sixth Circuit’s Byrd decision, the state of Illinois will have a hard time defending the discriminatory treatment challenged in Lebamoff.
During the International Wine Association’s 2018 Conference, Marc Sorini presented on the latest law developments, including the Commerce Clause and First Amendment.
The topic was made particularly timely by the Supreme Court’s September 27 decision to grant certiorari review of the Byrd v. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association decision.
On February 21, 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit published its opinion in Byrd v. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, No. 17-5552. The decision, which includes a partial dissent, affirms a Middle District of Tennessee decision finding that the “durational-residency” (residency) requirements imposed by Tennessee law for alcohol beverage retail licensees are unconstitutional under the “dormant” Commerce Clause.
Tennessee law requires an applicant for a retail license to have been a resident of Tennessee for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the submission of the license application. For corporate license applicants, the two-year requirement applies to any officer, director or stockholder of the corporation. Moreover, to renew such a license the law requires Tennessee residency for at least ten consecutive years.
Two prospective retail applicants that did not meet the two-year residency requirement, notably including the Tennessee affiliate of Total Wine Spirits & Beer, sought licenses. Expecting litigation, the Tennessee Attorney General filed a declaratory judgement action in state court seeking to have the residency requirements declared constitutional. The action was removed to federal court, and the Middle District of Tennessee found the requirements unconstitutional.
Subscribe
